Posted April 30, 2007

 Scott v. Harris (2007) 550 US ___ , WL 1237851

 US Supreme Court Rules that the Fourth Amendment is Not Violated when a Dangerous High-Speed Pursuit is Terminated by Ramming the Suspect's Car.

          Georgia deputy sheriff Timothy Scott ended a 10-minute pursuit at up to 85 mph by pushing the suspect's car. The suspect, Victor Harris, lost control, crashed and became a quadriplegic at 19. He sued for excessive force, and the federal trial court and appellate court upheld his suit.

          After viewing the deputy's video tape of the chase and seeing the dangerous moves Harris had made, the US Supreme Court reversed and granted Deputy Scott immunity from suit on the excessive force claim. By 8-1 vote, the court said it was irrelevant whether the deputy had departmental permission to use the maneuver, and the court rejected the proposition that officers should have ended the pursuit and tried to capture Harris later. It was Harris, after all, who created the danger to himself and to the public by fleeing and refusing to stop:

          "We are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people's lives in danger. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death."

          This decision rejects the idea that law enforcement agencies must adopt policies that require officers to abandon pursuits of drivers who endanger the public. The opinion also shows the importance of on-board video in repudiating false claims made by plaintiffs.

Posted April 2, 2007

 Winterrowd v. Nelson (9th Cir. 2006) WL 942378.

 Ninth Circuit Rules That Officers May be Civilly Liable For Excessive Force During Patdown of Driver With Physical Limitations

           Alaska State Troopers stopped Ralph Winterrowd for registration irregularities and sought to pat him down before having him get into the patrol car (lawfulness of the patdown was not at issue). When they told him to put his hands behind his back, he protested that a shoulder injury prevented his doing so. As alleged in the federal civil suit, one trooper jerked Winterrowd's arm behind him, forced it up and pushed him onto the hood of the car while Winterrowd screamed in pain. On suit for excessive force, the officers claimed qualified immunity.

          The Ninth Circuit, upholding the lower court ruling against the officers, said that since Winterrowd told the officers about his physical condition and was not actively resisting or otherwise suspected of violence, the officers should have conducted the patdown in another manner, consistent with the reported physical restrictions:

          "When no immediate threat is posed and the police can use other means of patting down a suspect, they may not insist on doing so in a manner that will cause the suspect pain. An officer may not use force solely because a suspect tells him he is incapable of complying with a request during the course of an ordinary pat-down."